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Abstract 
The admission by the Greek government on October 18, 2009, of large-scale 
accounting fraud in its national accounts sparked an unprecedented sovereign 
debt crisis that rapidly spread to the Eurozone’s weakest member states. As 
the crisis increasingly drove a wedge between a seemingly resilient Eurozone 
core and its faltering periphery, its first collateral victims were the private 
banks of the hardest-hit sovereigns. They were rapidly followed by the rest of 
the Eurozone’s banks as a result of their large exposure to not only their home 
country’s sovereign debt, but also to the debt securities of other member 
states. Measuring each bank’s precise exposure to every sovereign issuer 
became a key issue for credit analysis in the attempt to assess the potential 
impact of a selective sovereign default if worse came to worst. Yet finding 
that information in a timely manner is hardly an easy task, as banks are not 
required to disclose it. Building on the efficient market hypothesis in the 
presence of informed traders, we tested the sensitivity of each of the largest 
Eurozone private banks’ CDSs to sovereign CDSs using a simple 
autoregressive model estimated by time-series regressions and panel 
regressions, comparing the results to news releases to assess its reliability. 
Eventually, we used the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition to measure whether 
the unconventional monetary policies, namely the LTRO and the OMT, that 
the ECB has implemented to stem the crisis have helped banks directly or 
whether banks were actually helped by the reduction in sovereign CDS 
spreads. 
 
Keywords: Private Banks, Central Banks, Sovereign Debt Risk, OMT, LTRO, Non-
Conventional Monetary Policies, Eurozone’s Sovereign Debt Crisis, Oaxaca-Blinder 
Decomposition. 
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Introduction: 
Had the European Central Bank (ECB) not staged a massive intervention, the tenth 
anniversary of the Eurozone could easily have coincided with the implosion of the single 
currency. Few economists still doubt the actions of the ECB were both appropriate and 
sufficient.  In fact, the ECB’s announcement of massive long term refinancing operations in 
December 2011 is the most likely cause of the ensuing significant decrease of sovereign 
CDS spreads, which had spiked to unprecedented levels. This signaled, if not the end of the 
crisis, then at least the end of its most acute phase. Over the course of the following months, 
further easing of collateral requirements and the announcement of a whole new set of 
unconventional measures on secondary sovereign debt markets firmly reinstated the belief 
that the euro had truly been made “irreversible”, as stated by ECB President Mario Draghi 
when providing details on the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) mechanism later that 
year (Draghi, 2012). 
Yet the apparent resolution of the sovereign debt scare propelled another interesting 
debate into the public sphere: had the ECB’s interventions been more helpful to the 
Treasuries of peripheral Eurozone member states or to private banks holding vast amounts 
of government bonds. In other words, were taxpayers again at risk of bailing out large 
financial institutions less than two years after the whole sector had been either recapitalized 
or fully nationalized by states and therefore by taxpayers’ money? As austerity bites down 
on some of the hardest-hit countries in the Eurozone’s periphery, this interesting economic 
discussion gained a whole new dimension in the public sphere. This paper investigates this 
issue. 
Banks are affected by a deterioration in the creditworthiness of their home countries in 
more than one way, as evidenced by (Panetta, et al., 2011): the first one is that corporate 
CDS are mostly traded as spreads on their home country sovereign debt, thus upward 
movement on the base CDS generally affects the spreads of all the securities based on them. 
Secondly, states offer implicit guaranties for the bank creditors (“too big to fail” or “too 
interconnected too fail”) as the sequence of crises in the last decade starkly reminded us. 
Thus, an apparent decrease in the creditworthiness of the state is interpreted as a reduction in 
the value of the insurance, thus also a decrease in the creditworthiness of the bank 
incorporated in that country. And it is possible that, as we recently witnessed in Cyprus with 
the failure of Laiki Bank and the bail-in/bail-out of Bank of Cyprus, some banks hoard vast 
quantities of government bonds from their home state (Zoli, 2013) and (Bofondi, Carpinelli, 
& Sette, 2012), or from abroad (Greece in the case of Cypriot banks) for which the value 
decreases as their mark-to-market values adjust to movements in the discount rates or in the 
expected recovery rates. In the most extreme cases, debt renegotiations such as those for 
Greece (Petrakis & Christie, 2012) can directly imperil the principal of those securities 
(even if it usually implies a narrowing of the CDS spread and thus a reduction of the 
associated discount factor). 
To this day, there is no requirement for private banks to disclose their exposure to 
foreign sovereign bonds. Information about bank holdings of various government bonds is 
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thus the result of either voluntarily disclosure or exceptional disclosures, as occurred during 
the EU-wide bank stress tests sponsored by the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
European Central Bank (ECB) and national supervisory bodies in July 2010 and July 2011, 
or during the capital exercises in December 2011 (Bischof & Daske, 2012). Assessing the 
sovereign risk embedded in individual banks is thus a difficult exercise. Yet there is 
probably a large pool of informed traders dealing in CDS markets, which should thus signal 
to it the relative sensitivity of individual banks to a given sovereign credit risk. Following 
the work of (Maloney & Mulherin, 2003) on price formation in the presence of informed 
traders, we investigate this intuition using a very simple autoregressive (AR) model to test 
the market-implied sensitivities of banks’ CDSs to sovereign CDSs. 
 Out of simplicity considerations, in this study we chose to measure bank risk and 
sovereign risk using CDS spreads as in (Chiaramontea & Casu, 2012), even if there is an 
active academic debate on whether bond and CDS markets share the same information as in 
(Arce, Mayordomo, & Peña, 2012), (O’Kane, 2012) or (Palladini & Portes, 2011). However, 
in this paper we chose to focus on the largest European banks, which are precisely those that 
have the most liquid CDSs according to (Markit). We should thus expect liquidity problems 
to have a lesser distortionary impact on our sensitivity measurements. 
 This paper addresses two main research questions: firstly, do informed traders enable 
us to extract sovereign risk sensitivities for individual banks from market quotations, thus 
giving us hints regarding their real exposure to individual sovereign risks? Secondly, 
building upon the sensitivity analysis conducted in the first step, can we break down the 
impact of unconventional monetary policies implemented by the ECB into, on the one hand, 
the “pure impact” of the ECB’s measures (i.e. independent from sovereign risk 
considerations) and, on the other hand, the relaxation of their funding stress attributable to 
relaxation in sovereign funding? In other words, did the ECB’s action help banks directly, or 
indirectly by relaxing sovereign funding conditions? 
To address the first research question, we calibrated a conventional autoregressive 
model of order one AR(1) in the manner of that is usually used for sovereign CDS spreads, 
like (Sgherri & Zoli, 2009) or (Schuknecht, Hagen, & Wolswijk, 2011), assuming a 
relatively strong stationary hypothesis unlike the non-stationary co-integrated panel model 
used by (Giordano, Pericoli, & Tommasino, 2012). The calibration of the autoregressive 
parameter upholds this hypothesis, as we can consistently reject the integration hypothesis –
except for the Greek banks without the inclusion of the Greek sovereign CDS – thus leading 
us to believe that we can assume the data to be sufficiently stationary for the purpose of this 
paper, consistently with prior literature on the subject of determinants of CDS spreads. We 
then compare the results of the calibration, namely the parameters that are statistically 
significant with both information that was public at the time regarding sovereign asset 
holdings and a map of their known wholly owned foreign retail banking subsidiaries inside 
the Eurozone. Overall, the results we get seem consistent with both controls. 
Using the model calibrated previously, we then proceed in the manner of (Giordano, 
Pericoli, & Tommasino, 2012) following the model established by (Eichengreen & Mody, 
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2000) to disaggregate the role of “Pure”, “Shift” and “Wake-up-Call” contagions in 
emerging economies.  The “Shift” contagions arise from changes in the level of fundamental 
explanatory variables assuming constant sensitivities. The “Wake-up-Call” contagion is due 
to changes in the sensitivity towards explanatory exogenous variables of the model. Lastly, 
the residual “Pure” contagion cannot be attributed in any way to changes in the level of or 
sensitivities to the exogenous variables in the model. In our case, we know that the ECB’s 
actions acted as a “reverse contagion”, but we partially ignore the channel through which it 
operated, which brings us back to our research question regarding whether the observed 
reduction in bank funding costs immediately after the announcement of the LTRO and OMT 
operations is attributable to either “Pure” or “Wake-up-Call’ reverse contagion, or whether it 
should be attributed to “Shift” reverse contagion. The first two types of effects would uphold 
the belief that unconventional monetary policies had a direct impact on bank funding stress, 
while the last one would tend to uphold the indirect channel hypothesis. 
The calibration of the modified model to perform the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
as in (Giordano, Pericoli, & Tommasino, 2012) requires a very large number of parameters 
to be estimated. Achieving statistical significance with the Matlab routines used, we had to 
include a minimum of 300 trading days (roughly a year) before and after the LTRO event. 
This had two major unintended consequences: firstly, the 600 trading-day window was too 
large to establish the effect of the LTRO, which seemed to have been much shorted 
according to a basic analysis of CDS data. Secondly, our dataset does not extend a year after 
the announcement of the OMT, thus making it difficult for us to perform the computation on 
this event. 
To circumvent partially this time-window and data-availability problem, in a second 
step we proceed to a pooled OLS estimation of our model, which allowed us to focus on a 
one- to three-month data sample window. This approach has its own caveats: firstly, for 
short horizons, disentangling the noise of daily data from fundamental CDS movements 
seems more arduous, thus leading to weak parameter estimates except the firm-specific 
effects. Secondly, by using a homogeneous assumption regarding the value of the 
sensitivities of bank CDSs to sovereign CDSs and financial market proxies, we lose greatly 
in terms of model precision, thus also in terms of parameter determination, which could be 
detrimental to the strength of our findings. 
The paper is constructed as following: the first part presents the dataset used to 
perform the analysis, the second one presents the model and estimates it in Time Series 
format. Lastly, a third part addresses the panel-data approach to compute an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition over a shorter horizon. A discussion of the main results concludes. 
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1. Data:  
1.1. Bank CDS 
We tried to achieve the most comprehensive Eurozone bank dataset possible. Since we 
are investigating the role of international linkages, in particular the reverse contagion from 
peripheral Eurozone sovereigns to core private banks, we aimed to include the most 
systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs): those institutions are particularly 
active on the global financial markets and have liquid CDSs and equity stock prices. To 
avoid selection bias, we referred to the EBA’s assessment of the Eurozone SIFIs (EBA, 
2011). The downsizing of investment banks throughout Europe has lead a significant 
proportion of those banks to drop off the list, but since the current sovereign crisis and 
resultant banking crisis was caused by investment decisions taken prior to those 
restructuring events, we chose to take the list of banks that were significant at that time. 
 
Table 1: Bank CDS's Characteristics 
 
 
Out of the EBA’s list of 30 financial institutions, we immediately excluded the seven 
non-Eurozone incorporated banks. Of the remaining 23 banks, we further excluded the three 
public or non-listed banks present in the sample: the Bayerishe Landesbank (Germany), the 
Caixa General de Depositos (Portugal) and Rabobank (Netherlands). Major debt 
restructuring, government guarantees or outright default lead to a lack of data available and 
forced us to exclude four other banks:  Dexia (France), Anglo Irish Bank (Ireland), Caixa de 
Barcelona (Spain) and Eurobank EFG (Greece) had to be removed. Reflecting its national 
SIFIs status, the Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) was added to the sample. We therefore 
have a sample of 16 large, private, Eurozone incorporated banks for which daily data is 
available on our entire test period ranging from January 2008 to April 2013. Since Greece 
Shorthand Full Bank Name #Obs. CDS Type
ERS ERSTE GROUP BANK AG Austria (AT) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
RAI RAIF ZNTRLBK OSTER AG (AT) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
KBC KBC BANK Belgium (BE) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
DEU DEUTSCHE BANK AG Germany (DE) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
COM COMMERZBANK AG (DE) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BSN BANCO SANTANDER, SA Spain (SP) 1369 SNR XR 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BBV BBV ARGENTARIA SA (SP) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
SOC SOCIETE GENERALE France (FR) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BNP BNP PARIBAS (FR) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
CRE CREDIT AGRICOLE SA (FR) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
NAT NAT BK OF GREECE SA Greece (GR) 852 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
ALP ALPHA BANK A.E. (GR) 852 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BOI THE GOVERNOR AND CO BOI Ireland (IE) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
INT INTESA SANPAOLO SPA Italy (IT) 1369 SNR CR 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
UNI UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA (IT) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
ING ING BANK N.V. Netherlands (NL) 1369 SNR CR 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BCP BANCO COMR PORTUGUES SA Portugal (PT) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
BES BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO SA (PT) 1369 SNR MM 5Y E - CDS PREM. MID
Home Country
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technically defaulted in February 2012, we were not able to include the Greek SIFIs in our 
sample. We nonetheless created a supplementary restricted sample from November 2008 to 
February 2012, which includes both Alpha Bank (in place of Eurobank EFG) and National 
Bank. The five-year Senior CDS premia for all banks in the sample were retrieved in daily 
close format from Thomson Reuters DataStream. Most of these CDS were for the “Modified 
Modified Restructuring” (MM) type of credit events except for Intesa Sanpaolo and ING 
Bank which were for “Full Restructure” (CR) and Banco Santander which was for “No 
Restructure” (XR). 
 
Figure 1: Five-Year CDS for the Eurozone’s Large Private Banks 
 
 
1.2. Explanatory Variables: Sovereign CDS: 
 Since our model tries to estimate the impact of sovereign credit deteriorations 
throughout the Eurozone on bank funding conditions, and in particular to disentangle the 
LTRO’s impact on their refinancing, the main explanatory variable of our model consists in 
the sovereign CDS spreads of the main Eurozone economies. We again chose the five-year 
sovereign CDS spreads of a selected group of sovereigns. Out of the current Eurozone 
17-member club, we selected 11 by excluding Finland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Slovenia and 
Malta because of their very small sovereign debt and Slovakia and Estonia because they 
joined the club only in the first half of the sample period (2011). It thus includes the five 
“core” economies (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands) and the five 
“peripheral” countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) that have come to be 
known pejoratively as Europe’s “PIIGS”. We thus collected again from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream the daily closes of the five-year CDS for all countries except Greece from 
January 2008 to April 2013. CDSs for Greece stopped trading on February 22, 2012, when it 
restructured its sovereign debt. 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ERS
RAI
KBC
DEU
COM
BSN
BBV
SOC
BNP
CRE
NAT
ALP
BOI
INT
UNI
ING
BCP
BES
Source: Datastream.
N. Fulli-Lemaire 
8 
 
Figure 2: Eurozone's Sovereign CDS 
  
 
1.3. Explanatory and Control Variables: 
 To control for firm-specific characteristics, we included in our analysis two control 
variables: its Share Price and its Senior Debt Long Term Rating. Daily closes of the share 
prices were downloaded from Thomson Reuters DataStream and so were Standard & Poor’s 
long-term rating. To include this variable in the regression, we transformed the letter 
indicators into numeric input by linearly linking from D to AAA numbers from 1 to 22. To 
account for the rating outlook, we enhanced the rating by ¼ point for a “Positive Outlook” 
and by a ½ point for a “Positive Watch”. Symmetrically, ratings were reduced by a ¼ point 
for “Negative Outlook” and by a ½ point for “Negative Watch”. 
 
Figure 3: Bank’s share prices and S&P's long term ratings 
 
 As (Moody 2009) showed, the CDS spreads of both corporates and sovereigns in the 
pre-crisis era were determined mostly by global risk-aversion factors such as the VIX index 
(Chicago CBOE index on implied volatility on S&P500 Options), itself closely influencing 
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credit markets. To focus explicitly on the Eurozone, we chose to control for Global Risk 
Aversion using the VSTOXX index (STOXX index of implied volatility on EUROSTOXX 50 
options). To account for the global credit risk-aversion factor, we included the Meryl Lynch 
Euro BBB Corporate Government Option Adjusted Spread (Er40_GOAS) in our analysis. 
To account for the state of the Eurozone’s interbank market, we included the Euro’s BOR-
OIS Spread (Hull White), which is considered a good proxy. We obtained it by subtracting 
the three-month Euro-OIS from the three-month Euribor rate. All of these control variables 
were retrieved in daily close format from Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
 
Figure 4: Global Risk Aversion, Credit Risk and Interbank Market confidence proxies: 
 
Eventually, we introduced our three specific-event dummy variables: the first one 
being the currently commonly accepted beginning of the Eurozone’s sovereign crisis, that is, 
the official reckoning by the Greek government of massive accounting frauds on October 
18, 2009. The second event-specific dummy we introduced was the announcement of the 
launch of LTROs by the ECB on December 8, 2011. Thirdly, we added a dummy to account 
for the ECB’s change of policy announced on August 2, 2012, regarding OMT transactions. 
Unreported tests on different event-specific dummies proved inconclusive: the effect of 
LTROs might have been enhanced by including the two effective operation dates (December 
20, 2011, and February 28, 2012) or the Greek technical sovereign default (or debt 
renegotiation) on March 9, 2012. The closeness of all those events leads to a restricted 
choice of only three: the G (Greek dummy), L (LTRO dummy) and the O (OMT dummy). 
All of the dummy variables are worth zero before the triggering event and 1 after it. 
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2. Time Series Regressions: 
2.1. Time Series Model: 
In accordance with the current financial literature, we wish to fit on our data the 
following AR(1) model: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ ߙ௜ ൭
1
	
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
൱	
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஺ோሺଵሻ	ி௔௖௧௢௥
൅ ߚ௜ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣௟௔௡௔௧௢௥௬
൅ ߛ௜ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௢௠௠௢௡	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߜ௜ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ி௜௥௠	ௌ௣௘௖௜௙௜௖	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߠ௜ 	൭
ॳ௧	ॷ௧
ॹ௧
൱	
ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
஽௨௠௠௜௘௦
൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
We ran two different regressions according to our sample period: in the first one we 
excluded Greek banks and the Greek sovereign from our dataset and we then ran a specific 
regression for the Greek banks on the restricted sample previously exposed, trivially 
omitting the OMT’s dummy variable.  
In order for our model to be stable (stationary), we need the estimated coefficients to 
respect the boundary condition: 
∀݅, |ߙ݅| ൏ 1 
Since Greek banks’ CDSs were available in a much larger sample than the Greek 
sovereign’s, we could have included Greek banks but excluded the Greek sovereign on a 
much larger dataset. Yet, unsurprisingly, the specificity of the Greek sovereign CDS is so 
large that if we omitted it, the autoregressive parameter ߙ௜ would reach a value significantly 
higher than 1 (reassuringly for our model). We thus excluded both from our main study. 
We thus fitted on the Greek banks’ CDS data the following reduced model without the 
ॹ dummy variable since our sample does not extend up to the triggering event: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ ߙ௜ ൭
1
	
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
൱	
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ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣௟௔௡௔௧௢௥௬
൅ ߛ௜ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௢௠௠௢௡	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߜ௜ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ி௜௥௠	ௌ௣௘௖௜௙௜௖	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߠ௜ 	൭
ॳ௧		
ॷ௧
൱	
ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
஽௨௠௠௜௘௦
൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
2.2. Time Series Results: 
First of all, in order to be able to use our model, we must conduct a test on our 
boundary condition for our autoregressive parameters: since our estimated coefficients are 
close to one, we clearly have a near-integrated process. We ran a Fisher test on whether the 
estimated coefficients are significantly different from one. The results for both of our 
datasets are presented in Tables 6 & 7 and in Table 8. Reassuringly, the estimated 
coefficients are statistically always significantly different from 1 for all banks tested in both 
of our datasets. We can thus apply our model to study the impact of the LTRO on the 
refinancing of private banks. 
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The first obvious comment that arises from the analysis of the longer dataset excluding 
Greek banks is that the ॳ dummy coefficient is statistically significant for all the banks 
present in the sample at the 99% level and negative. This first result is in itself not surprising 
considering the importance of the impact of this single triggering event. The second 
conclusion we can draw from this regression is that for all the banks incorporated in one of 
the four-week sovereigns included in the sample, the home-sovereign-CDS parameter was 
always significant at the 99% level and positive. For SOC (French), the Belgian and both of 
the Austrian banks, it was also positive and highly significant. For the Dutch, German and 
two of the French banks (BNP & CRE) it was not significantly different from zero. 
The most probable explanation for these phenomena is that, on the one hand, the 
deterioration of the perception of the creditworthiness of the peripheral sovereigns led to a 
contagion to the banks incorporated on their territories, thus linking the CDSs of sovereigns 
and private banks. On the other hand, banks incorporated in countries where 
creditworthiness was not significantly altered during the “sovereign crisis”, such as France 
or Germany, but where private banks’ financial health were severely threatened by the rapid 
deterioration of the Eurozone’s peripheral countries, gained little from the stability of their 
home sovereign but were negatively impacted by the deterioration of the peripheral 
sovereigns. For example, French, German and Dutch banks all have a significant and 
positive coefficient on at least Italy (some also have significantly positive coefficients on 
Spain, Portugal or Ireland). This is clearly not the case for the Belgian or Austrian banks. 
The answer to this question must therefore lie in the composition of their books and in their 
respective footprints in core versus peripheral countries. 
While the Greek crisis dummy had an unquestionable effect on all of the Eurozone 
banks in the sample, thus highlighting its systemic nature, this is clearly not the case for the 
ॷ dummy: on the one hand, the LTRO’s dummy coefficient for the Austrian, Belgian and 
Portuguese banks was not significant and it was barely so (90% significance only) for the 
Irish banks. On the other hand, the LTRO’s dummy coefficient for Spanish, Italian, Dutch, 
and French banks (albeit with a lower 95% significance for BNP) was highly significant. As 
for German banks, interestingly so, the coefficient is not significant for DEU, while it is 
highly significant for COM. 
These results should really come as no surprise: the banks whose head offices were 
incorporated in countries where sovereigns were the worst affected by the crisis, like Ireland 
or Portugal (and Greece), and where the banking sector was already either receiving massive 
international aid, like the Greek bank’s Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, or had already 
been recapitalized by their home-country states therefore had little to gain from these 
refinancing operations. Meanwhile, banks incorporated in countries where sovereigns were 
slightly less affected by the crisis and which were still able to issue without guarantees on 
the market, albeit with some restrictions, like Spain or Italy, were the ideal candidates to tap 
the ECB’s new facility and thus enhance their creditworthiness as a result. Importantly, the 
ECB’s facility was aimed at bailing out banks not only in the periphery of the Eurozone, but 
also in its core: French, Dutch and German banks all possibly had good reasons to use the 
ECB’s facility. Indeed,  the motives for using the ECB’s facility could be twofold: firstly, by 
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using the ECB’s facility as a credit line to invest in government bonds yielding a positive 
carry (typically Italian BTPs)  and secondly to help refinance banks that were put in a 
precarious situation as a result of the sovereign crisis due to their exposure to either (or both) 
their investment portfolio earning a negative carry as a result of surging funding costs or 
because of difficulties refinancing their branches operating in the periphery.  
Spanish and Italian banks have benefited massively from the LTROs (Reuters, 2012),  
and it is interesting to note that, for those countries in particular, it is known that a 
significant fraction of those funds went directly into government securities carrying a 
significant positive carry (Reuters, 2012). INT’s Chairman Andrea Beltratti was explicit: 
“The new funds, which come with a 1% interest rate, will be used in part “for a profitable 
trading strategy regarding Italian government bonds,” (Enrich, 2012). 
While COM seems to have clearly benefited from the LTRO, its national peer DEU 
did not. The most probable answer is that COM and DEU were in very different financial 
positions at the time of the LTRO announcement: while the latter seemed to be in a strong 
financial position, the former seemed closer to distress, as attested by the fact that barely a 
few days before the first LTRO round, COM was facing outright nationalization (Wiesmann 
& Wilson, 2011) as a result of a €5.3bn capital gap identified a few days before by 
regulators during the EBA’s 2011 stress tests (Jenkins & Atkins, European banks have 
€115bn shortfall, 2012). Furthermore, as DEU’s then-Chairman Ackermann put it: “The fact 
that we have never taken any money from the government has made us, from a reputational 
point of view, so attractive to so many clients in the world that we would be very reluctant to 
give that up”. He also rejected the ECB-sponsored sovereign carry trade “I’m normally not a 
friend of carry trades, and I don’t think that we would borrow money to buy sovereign risks 
even if there is an attractive spread.” (Comfort & Kirchfeld, 2012). Yet, those arguments 
failed to prevent DEU from participating in the second auction (Jenkins, 2013). 
Why has the LTRO had no impact on the Austrian and Belgian banks? The basic 
explanation should lie in the fact that both of the banks in the sample made very limited use 
of the new facility: RAI didn’t participate in the first round and tapped the facility for a very 
limited amount in the second round (Global Banking News, 2012). ERS seemed to have 
participated in both LTRO rounds but also took only a limited amount from it (Dow Jones 
Newswires Reporters, 2012). The most probable explanation lies in the fact that, though 
highly internationally diversified, Austrian banks have limited exposure to peripheral 
Eurozone countries (most of their foreign exposure is in the CEE/CIS region) as is attested 
by (Moody's, 2013). 
KBC did participate in both of the LTRO rounds, yet indicated that most of it had been 
to refinance its Irish subsidiary. Moreover, it used Irish collateral for the operation (KBC , 
2013). That might explain why its global creditworthiness at the group level remained pretty 
much unchanged, thus yielding an insignificant LTRO dummy coefficient. 
It is particularly interesting to note that the significance of sensitivity to sovereign 
CDSs of individual banks in Tables 6 & 7 closely reflects the mapping of their foreign 
subsidiaries. Table 2 was constructed using the latest annual report of each bank to pinpoint 
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the localization of their wholly-owned retail-banking subsidiaries. As a caveat, we must 
mention that the definition might not be entirely consistent EU-wise and some significant 
exposure to a given country might have gone unnoticed: for example, some banks seem to 
have large wholesale corporate lending activities in specific countries where they do not 
necessarily have a large retail footprint, which are thus harder to track compared to retail 
activities. 
 
Table 2 : Matrix of foreign wholly-owned retail subsidiaries. 
 
Importantly, those findings are consistent with the BIS report on the “Euro area bank 
use of ECB facilities” (BIS, 2012):  
 It appeared that the largest users of the two LTRO facilities provided by the ECB 
were Italian and Spanish banks, followed by Belgian and French banks. Inversely, 
Finnish, German and Luxembourg banks continued to stay away from those facilities 
while Greek, Irish and Portuguese banks, which had largely benefited from the 
previous refinancing operations, did not appear to have engaged any further in the 
two exceptional ones. The lack of additional available assets to pledge at the ECB is 
but one hypothesis.  
 It also appeared that after the two rounds of refinancing, the Finnish, German and 
Luxembourg banks greatly increased their deposits at the ECB, while Belgian, 
French, Italian and Spanish banks did so on a much more modest scale. Greek, Irish 
and Portuguese bank deposits at the ECB remained close to nil.  
 Furthermore, there is also evidence in the report that, between the two LTRO rounds, 
the banking sector shorted their German and French government bond positions and 
greatly increased their Spanish and Italian government debt holdings. A small 
increase was also measured for holdings of Irish government debt securities. 
 
AT Yes Yes - - - - - - - - - - - - Yes - - -
BE - - Yes - - - - - Yes Yes - - - - - Yes - -
DE - - - Yes Yes - - - - - - - - - Yes Yes - -
ES - - - - - Yes Yes - - Yes - - - - - - - Yes
FR - - - - - - - Yes Yes Yes - - - - - - - Yes
GR - - - - - - - Yes * - Yes ** Yes Yes - - - - Yes -
IE - - Yes - - - - - - - - - Yes - - - - -
IT - - - - - - - - Yes Yes - - - Yes Yes - - -
NL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Yes - -
PT - - - - - Yes - - - - - - - - - - Yes Yes
*: Untill 14-Dec-2012. **: Untill 1-Feb-2013.
BSNERS RAI KBC DEU COM BESBBV SOC BNP CRE NAT ALP BOI INT UNI ING BCP
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2.3. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition for Time Series: 
Going back to our AR(1) model: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ ߙ௜ ൭
1
	
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
൱	
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஺ோሺଵሻ	ி௔௖௧௢௥
൅ ߚ௜ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣௟௔௡௔௧௢௥௬
൅ ߛ௜ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
஼௢௠௠௢௡	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߜ௜ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ி௜௥௠	ௌ௣௘௖௜௙௜௖	ி௔௖௧௢௥௦
൅ ߠ௜ 	൭
ॳ௧	ॷ௧
ॹ௧
൱	
ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
஽௨௠௠௬௦
൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Which we will modify in the following way: 
Let ॷ be the LTRO dummy and remove the ॳ and ॹ dummies, which are constant 
throughout our period: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ቌ
1
	ॷ௧
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
ቍ	൅	ሺߚ௜ ൅ ߚ௜௅ॷ௧ሻቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቍ ൅ ሺߛ௜ ൅ ߛ௜௅ॷ௧ሻቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
൅ ሺߜ௜ ൅ ߜ௜௅ॷ௧ሻ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Taking the conditional expectation of the CDS innovations according to our LTRO dummy 
variable, it yields: 
Let ߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞represents the innovation at date t of the bank I CDS’s: 
߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ െ ߙଵ	௜	ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞ 
ॱ௧൫߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞หॷ௧ ൌ 0൯
ൌ 	ߙ଴	௜ ൅	൅ߚ௜ॱ௧ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 0ቍ ൅ ߛ௜ॱ௧ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 0ቍ
൅ ߜ௜ॱ௧ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
อॷ௧ ൌ 0൱ 
And: 
ॱ௧൫߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞หॷ௧ ൌ 1൯ ൌ 	ߙ଴	௜ ൅ ߙ	଴௅௜ ൅	ሺߚ௜ ൅ ߚ௜௅ሻॱ௧ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ	
																																							൅ሺߛ௜ ൅ ߛ௜௅ሻॱ௧ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ ൅ ሺߜ௜ ൅ ߜ௜௅ሻॱ௧ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
อॷ௧ ൌ 1൱ 
By independence of the errors, 
ॱ௧൫ߝ௜,௧หॷ௧ ൌ ݔ൯ ൌ ॱ௧൫ߝ௜,௧൯ ൌ 0 
Combining both equations, we can rewrite our problem in the following way: 
ॱ௧൫߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞หॷ௧ ൌ 1൯ െ ॱ௧൫߮௜,௧஻௔௡௞หॷ௧ ൌ 0൯ ൌ ܣ ൅ ܤ ൅ ܥ 
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With 
ܣ ൌ 	ߙ	଴௅௜ 
ܤ ൌ 	ߚ௜ ቐॱ௧ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ െ ॱ௧ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 0ቍቑ ൅ ߛ௜ ቐॱ௧ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ
െ ॱ௧ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 0ቍቑ൅ߜ௜ ൝ॱ௧ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
อॷ௧ ൌ 1൱ െ ॱ௧ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
อॷ௧ ൌ 0൱ൡ 
ܥ ൌ ߚ௜௅ॱ௧ ቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ ൅ ߛ௜௅	ॱ௧ ቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቮॷ௧ ൌ 1ቍ൅ߜ௜௅ॱ௧ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
อॷ௧ ൌ 0൱ 
 
In the following specification, focusing only on the exogenous innovations part, we can 
explain the three factors in the following way: 
 ܣ represents the “Pure” LTRO effect that cannot be attributed to any exogenous 
explanatory variable or coefficient changes. 
 ܤ represents the “Shift” effect of the LTRO on the exogenous variables. 
 ܥ represents the “Wake-up-Call” effect of the LTRO on sensitivities to our 
exogenous variables and controls. 
Under this specification, ܤ should represent the way bank funding were enhanced by the 
LTRO through a relaxation of the sovereign scare, while ܣ and ܥ should represent the direct 
impact of the LTRO on bank funding. 
 
2.4. Time Series Decomposition Results: 
The TS approach we tried as a first step falls short of a severe caveat, namely the 
dimension problem: the numerous dummy variables included to measure the LTRO’s effect 
require a high number of observations to achieve a reasonable statistical significance. In 
practice, considering our 30 explanatory regressors, we measured the minimal sample of 600 
points. Such a lengthy horizon would more than span the LTRO’s maximum effectiveness 
period: considering that Eurozone bank CDSs spiked in December 2011, at the time of our 
sample period, going 300 points (roughly a year) before and after that date should give us a 
measurement of the LTRO’s effectiveness. Yet, barely a quarter after the LTRO became 
effective, bank CDSs shot back upward as a result of resurging sovereign default fears 
triggered by Spain’s predicted budgetary deficit slippage and increasing contestation of 
austerity measures around Europe, thus complicating measurement of the LTRO’s long-term 
effect, which by the look of the TS results appears short-lived.  
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Table 3: Oaxaca-Blinder Time Series Decomposition Factor Estimation for the LTRO 
 
 Overall, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the time series data in Table 3 yields a 
large “Pure” effect and an equivalently large but contradictory “Wake-up-Call” effect. The 
“Shift” effect appears negligible. In terms of aggregate effects, only the BOI’s average CDS 
level diminished after the LTRO. The Sovereign “Wake-up-Call” effect (CS) is interestingly 
always negative and large for the banks, which in the prior regression analysis had proved to 
have a significant LTRO or OMT dummy.  Considering the above-mentioned caveats, any 
further interpretation of the results in terms of the ways of action of the LTRO would seem 
farfetched. In order to at least partially overcome those caveats, we proceed to an analysis in 
panel in the next section. 
 
3. Panel Data Analysis: 
3.1. Pooled OLS regression: 
Since the estimation of the Least-Square Dummy Variable model (LSDV) previously 
proposed to perform the estimation of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition requires a sample 
period for which the length greatly exceeds our target range (300 trading days versus 25 to 
150), we proceed to an analysis in panel. Going back to the AR(1) model previously used 
for our time series regressions: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ቌ
1
	ॷ௧
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
ቍ	൅	ሺߚ௜ ൅ ߚ௜௅ॷ௧ሻቌ
ܥܦܵ௧,ଵௌ௩௚௡
⋮
ܥܦܵ௧,ேௌ௩௚௡
ቍ ൅ ሺߛ௜ ൅ ߛ௜௅ॷ௧ሻቌ
ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
൅ ሺߜ௜ ൅ ߜ௜௅ॷ௧ሻ ൭
݄ܵܽݎ݁ ௜ܲ,௧	
ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Effect Pure Total
ERS 492.23 12.19 3.82 -2.48 10.84 -496.96 -6.94 15.10 -505.13 7.46
RAI 121.60 1.78 -0.11 -1.03 2.91 -120.84 -8.23 27.94 -140.56 2.54
KBC 202.09 -3.01 -5.59 -2.99 5.58 -191.18 -7.07 12.42 -196.54 7.90
DEU -274.88 11.78 14.71 -6.83 3.91 267.16 -31.72 46.03 252.85 4.07
COM -309.25 1.84 -4.51 -6.06 12.40 317.49 -15.36 49.54 283.31 10.08
BSN -172.62 37.67 5.24 -2.40 34.83 168.61 -37.04 53.44 152.21 33.66
BBV -22.25 37.77 17.03 -3.31 24.05 14.24 -43.57 17.17 40.64 29.76
SOC -97.67 0.82 3.48 -8.78 6.12 121.98 -16.31 29.45 108.84 25.13
BNP 73.95 8.44 15.96 -7.06 -0.46 -64.10 -26.69 30.28 -67.69 18.28
CRE -85.66 14.25 14.96 -9.58 8.86 94.56 -16.68 32.99 78.25 23.15
BOI -3 200.66 58.77 3.32 -15.84 71.29 3 095.27 -201.94 194.42 3 102.79 -46.63
INT 651.82 -61.37 20.52 -7.52 -74.38 -550.12 -30.79 52.47 -571.80 40.33
UNI 139.32 7.14 26.79 -8.24 -11.41 -118.89 -44.93 44.88 -118.85 27.56
ING -488.23 -1.39 1.11 -3.02 0.52 499.01 -20.80 -3.56 523.37 9.39
BCP 109.21 -9.92 -1.17 -2.86 -5.89 -92.01 -77.53 58.64 -73.12 7.28
BES 59.53 35.38 16.68 -2.98 21.67 -93.11 -85.50 48.73 -56.35 1.79
CC CP A+B+C
Bank LTRO +/- 300 Trading Days (≈ 12M)
Changes with Cst. Coefficients New Coefficients post LTRO
A B BS BC BP C CS
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We modify it by adding a firm-specific fixed effect (ߦ௜ሻ	through the use of a set of dummy 
variables (	ॲ௜ሻ:  
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ቌ
1
	ॷ௧
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ஻௔௡௞
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ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱ ൅ ሺߦ௜ ൅ ߦ௜௅ॷ௧ሻ	ॲ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Since our estimation windows can be narrowed to 25-150 trading days, in this panel 
framework we can also estimate the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition around the OMT event, 
which was previously impossible: 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧஻௔௡௞ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ቌ
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⋮
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ܸܱܵܶܺܺ௧ܤܱܴܱܫܵ௧	
ܤܤܤீை஺ௌ௧
ቍ
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ܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧
൱ ൅ ሺߦ௜ ൅ ߦ௜௅ॹ௧ሻሺ	ॲ௜ሻଵ:ଵହ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
3.2. Fixed effects pooled OLS results: 
The results from the pooled-OLS regressions for the LTRO and the OMT are 
presented respectively in Table 11 and Table 12. Consistently with the prior time-series 
regression we performed as a first step, we presented the results of the calibration of our 
model centered on the LTRO dummy trigger date, with a sample size of +/- 25, 75 and 150 
trading days, which roughly represent one, three and six months before and after the event. 
The one-month-sampling calibration exercise aimed to establish the most immediate 
short-term effect of the LTRO on an aggregated sample of 816 points. Yet, even if we have 
a relatively low autoregressive parameter (0.62) and a relatively good R² (99.66%), the only 
significant parameters at this stage are the firm-specific control variables and only those 
without the LTRO dummy multiplier). It is relatively unsurprising that with such a short 
calibration horizon there would be a high level of heterogeneity in the sensitivities to 
sovereign credit risk, thus a weak significance parameter. 
The  three-month and six-month sampling calibration exercises yield a more 
balanced picture as some sovereign risks like AT, SP, IE and PT, respectively DE, SP, IE 
and IT, achieve statistical significance with various levels of confidence, although the firm-
specific dummy variables still dominates. Those results would tend to confirm that the 
LTRO had a systematic effect on at least some of the sovereign risk sensitivities over a 
slightly longer period. 
The results of the calibration exercises centered on the OMT announcement, with the 
same sample sizes as before, are much clearer regardless of the horizon: even though the 
control variables, both the firm-specific ones and the general risk-factor ones, have a 
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consistently high statistical significance, the sovereign risk dummies, both with and without 
the OMT dummy multiplier, achieve a high level of statistical significance. We should thus 
be able to have a reliable horizon-dependent analysis of the OMT’s effect with the Oaxaca-
Blinder Decomposition as the OMT’s effect on sovereign-risk sensitivities appears 
systematic compared to the LTRO’s effect which appeared, at least in the very short term, to 
be highly firm-specific and thus more difficult to measure reliably with a pooled regression 
approach. 
 
3.3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on panel data 
To account for the fixed effect, we modify the A factor by including the firm fixed-
effect coefficient	ࣈ࢏ࡸ: 
ܣ ൌ 	ߙ	଴௅௜ ൅	ߦ௜௅ 
Thus, the B and C factors previously introduced in the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition should be affected only by sensitivities towards systematic risk components. 
Firm-specific sensitivities should only be reflected in the A factor. Nonetheless, the B and C 
factors are not purely systematic as the value of the firm-specific control variables (share 
price and long-term rating) are by definition idiosyncratic: the BP and CP sub-factors are 
thus partly firm-specific because of the common sensitivities used in their computation. The 
results for the Oaxaca-Binder decomposition around the LTRO and OMT events for our 
three sample sizes previously introduced are presented respectively in Table 9 and Table 10. 
 For the LTRO, and because of the previously exposed caveats regarding the 
significance of the sensitivities to sovereign risks, the results of the one-month exercise 
should be discarded. At the three-month level, the “Pure” effect is still strongly negative 
while the “Wake-up-Call” and “Shift” effects are positive. At the six-month level, the “Pure” 
effect diminished greatly in absolute value and becomes positive in sign. The “Wake-up-
Call” effect diminished and remains positive. Interestingly, the “Shift” effect becomes 
dominant and negative. Moreover, the sub-components leading to the negative values are 
firstly those of the sovereign shift (CS) and secondly of the control variables (CP). We 
should thus conclude that, for the LTRO, we have weak evidence that initially the channel 
through which it reduced bank funding stress was not intrinsically linked to a reduction in 
perceived sovereign risk (on the contrary) but rather a reduction in the banks’ perceived 
idiosyncratic risk.  Later, the dominating channel becomes the reduction in the sensitivities 
to sovereign risk, consistently with the findings of (Acharya, Drechsler, & Schnabl, 2011). 
 As for the OMT, regardless of the horizon considered, the “Pure” effect is 
consistently large and negative. Inversely, the “Wake-up-Call” effect is also consistently 
positive and large. The “Shift” effect is also significant and negative, and its size shrinks as 
the maturity lengthens. The “Sovereign-Shift” (BS) sub-effect is consistently negative, but 
its size reduces as the maturity increases. Interestingly, the “Sovereign Wake-up-Call” sub-
effect (CS) is initially positive and then becomes negative. Overall, the OMT’s effect is 
strongest in the short term and then diminishes with maturity. At the six–month horizon, the 
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only large effects left are those for the Irish and Portuguese banks. It is somewhat 
unsurprising since the OMT action plan requires that the country undergoes an EU-
commission plan before the ECB is allowed to intervene in the secondary sovereign bond 
markets of that country. Considering that both Portugal and Ireland are the only countries 
under a joint EU-Commission/ECB/IMF (“Troika”) assistance plan, they are the two 
countries most susceptible to benefit from the OMT in the short term. As for the channel of 
action, in the case of the OMT, it seems that both the idiosyncratic reduction in perceived 
bank risk and the reduction in sovereign risk (also in terms of both sensitivities and levels) 
were effective, with the latter kicking in after the former.  
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Conclusion: 
The dramatic events of the last five years have led to a complete redesign of the 
rulebook of central banking all over the world as the macro-prudential stability objective 
seemed to have become the driving factor for essentially every central bank’s policy 
decisions of late. As central banks took the front stage to spearhead the initial fight against 
the banking crisis then the sovereign debt scare contagion, the traditional objectives of price 
stability – and employment for some – seemed to have moved backstage. This new course in 
policy has been probably driven by a mix of imperatives and pragmatism as central banks 
rediscovered the full extent of the notion of “lender of last resort” when interbank markets 
froze in 2008, or when the sovereign funding channels dried up in 2010 and the specter of a 
cascade of outright sovereign defaults in advanced economies surfaced in the Eurozone, 
thereby jeopardizing the very existence of the single-currency monetary union. 
Of all the unconventional monetary policies implemented during those difficult 
years, none was more controversial than the long-term refinancing operations of private 
banks: at a time when Europe’s hardest-hit countries were feeling the full extent of the 
austerity measures imposed either by international creditors trying to shore up the public 
finances of several Eurozone members or by the governments of other member states 
desperately trying to avoid suffering the same fate as Greece, public resentment against the 
banks accused of having wrecked the economy was rife. These unconventional monetary 
policies have led to a string of existential controversies both inside and outside of central 
banks, but it was nowhere as acute as within the European Central Bank: the relatively 
young institution had to navigate treacherous waters, balancing the heritage of northern 
hawks with the pressing needs of its peripheral members, eventually edging toward a major 
board reshuffling to accompany the change in course set by its new pragmatic president 
Mario Draghi. 
 As the debate moved from policy-makers to commentators and politicians, many 
researchers both in academia and in the industry have started to work on those complex 
issues and this work follows their steps. The main objective of the paper was to establish 
whether the unconventional monetary policies implemented by the ECB in the wake of the 
Eurozone’s sovereign crisis, namely the LTRO and the OMT, had benefited banks directly 
or indirectly through a relaxation of the sovereign credit-risk scare. As a minor objective, 
this paper looked at whether the market perception of bank credit risk accurately reflected 
public information on their exposures to sovereign risk, thereby potentially providing both a 
market-based information set on banks’ exposure to sovereign risks. Most importantly it 
provides an operational framework in which we could run the procedure in order to 
disentangle the various contributions of the relaxation in bank funding conditions and thus 
provide an answer to our main research question. 
 By running a dummy variable least-square regression on each of the time series of 
the CDSs of the most important private banks of the Eurozone on which public data was 
available, we measured the explanatory power and significance of the estimated parameters 
of the sensitivities to individual sovereign risk measured also by their respective CDSs. 
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Included in the analysis were conventional control variables on both firm-specific 
characteristics and more general market-level factors. Dummy variables were included to 
sort out the direct impact of three specific events: the onset of the sovereign scare and the 
announcement of both the LTROs and the OMT. The analysis of the results seems strongly 
consistent with both news releases and the map of banks’ retail operations in the countries 
present in our sample, our control for direct operational exposure to given sovereign risks. 
This is different from the financial asset holding exposure, on which much less information 
is available even if there is potentially a strong link between both. Overall, those results 
support the use of the model to proceed with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. 
 Following the paper of (Giordano, Pericoli, & Tommasino, 2012) using the 
decomposition technique of (Eichengreen & Mody, 2000) to study the channels of 
“contagion” of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis sparked by the surprise Greek admission 
of window dressing of their national accounts, we endeavor to establish the “reverse-
contagion” channels stemming from the unconventional monetary actions undertaken by the 
ECB. The model allows us to filter the “reverse contagion” between the “Pure” effect, the 
“Shift” in the levels of the explanatory variables (i.e. the sovereign CDSs and the control 
variables) and the “Wake-up-Call” effect of changes in the sensitivities toward the 
explanatory variables. Out of the three principal factors, the “Shift” effect directly exposes 
the indirect channel of relaxation of bank funding conditions, while the other two mostly 
reflect the direct effect of the operations.   
 The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition performed on individual banks’ 
time series of CDSs could not reveal much, as the length of the sample required to calibrate 
the model exceeds one year before and after the critical date, which is much longer than the 
effective impact of the LTRO. The OMT’s impact could not even be assessed because of 
data availability issues, even though it probably lasted sufficiently long for the time-series 
methodology to be effective. To overcome that issue, we proceeded in a panel data approach 
using a pooled-OLS regression methodology and obtained the following results for both 
operations: 
 At an aggregate level, the LTRO’s impact on bank funding conditions appears to 
have followed a two-step dynamic, consistently with (Acharya, Drechsler, & Schnabl, 
2011). Initially, the “Pure” factor leads the fall in banks’ CDS levels while the other two 
factors slow the reduction. As we increase the horizon at which the effect is measured, we 
observe a reversal of the factors: the “Shift” effect dominates while the other two are smaller 
and positive. Moreover, the leading negative sub-factor is the “Sovereign Shift”. We can 
thus conclude that the effect of the LTRO on easing bank funding stress had initially been 
direct, and thus independent of any sovereign risk consideration, and then became indirect as 
the transmission channel became the source of the reduction of sovereign risks. 
 For the OMT’s impact, the effect seems relatively horizon-independent: the “Wake-
up-Call” is consistently large and positive while the other two effects are negative. The 
“Shift” effect does decrease over time. It should be noted that overall the aggregate effect 
also decreases with time and only remains outsized for the Irish and the Portuguese banks. 
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In terms of transmission channels, we can thereby conclude that the indirect effect of the 
OMT decreases over time while the direct effect dominates. 
 In a nutshell, we cannot definitively affirm that the dominant channel of action for 
the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies has been either the direct or the indirect 
channel. Both have clearly been active as banks benefited from both an exogenous 
enhancement of their credit perception by the market and from the relaxation of the 
sovereign funding stress. The most surprising result has been that even though the LTRO 
was enacted primarily to stem the bank funding stress while the OMT was primarily directed 
at reducing sovereign funding stress, the effect has been relatively equivalent in terms of 
sovereign funding impact on banks. Even more surprising, the OMT seems to have had a 
longer lasting “pure” impact on bank funding conditions, independently of any sovereign 
funding considerations. 
 In terms of potential improvements, we can already identify the following, clearly 
non-exhaustive, list: to enhance the significance of the sensitivities and thus the power of the 
decomposition, a more firm-specific parsimonious model could have been implemented by, 
for example, omitting all the variables that appear not to be insignificant at the individual 
bank level in a second-stage regression. It would also have been interesting to test our model 
on public banks, for which state support is even more immediate, even if it would require 
adjustments in the control variables as share prices, for example, are rarely available for 
such banks. Also, it could have been interesting to identify firm-specific breakpoints in the 
sensitivities arising from mergers, acquisitions or divestment by running the time-series 
regression with a reduced timespan to account for changes in the sensitivities, which are 
here averaged because of our time-constant restrictive assumption. Those issues are left for 
future research. 
 The logical conclusion that should be drawn from the results of this paper is that 
from the central bank’s point of view, it appears virtually impossible to act on bank funding 
or on sovereign funding conditions alone without simultaneously affecting the other. The 
unconventional monetary policies undertaken by the ECB, regardless of their intended 
targets, have been mutually beneficial over the medium to long term. It would be wise to 
remember this when future interventions are debated, regardless of the politically damaging 
but rapidly subsiding short-term differentiating effect, which seemed to have benefited 
banks more than sovereign issuers. The symbiotic responses of states and banks to central 
bank interventions identified in this paper strongly uphold the EU’s proposed Banking 
Union, which would have banks supervised by the ECB (Asmussen, 2013). 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Testing the unit boundary condition for the AR(1) parameter for all private banks except 
Greeks. 
 
 
Table 5: Testing the unit boundary condition for the AR(1) parameter for the Greek banks 
 
 
AR(1) Unit Root test for near-integreted series
ERS 0.945 *** -7.772 7.59458E-15
RAI 0.933 *** -8.497 2.54378E-17
KBC 0.942 *** -7.159 6.63567E-13
DEU 0.876 *** -12.652 4.65847E-35
COM 0.908 *** -10.519 3.16313E-25
BSN 0.820 *** -17.244 1.11114E-60
BBV 0.828 *** -18.001 2.08836E-65
SOC 0.804 *** -18.638 1.76279E-69
BNP 0.820 *** -16.849 2.89835E-58
CRE 0.821 *** -17.602 6.70642E-63
BOI 0.903 *** -8.415 4.95107E-17
INT 0.849 *** -16.043 1.87855E-53
UNI 0.878 *** -14.400 3.8081E-44
ING 0.924 *** -9.437 8.10489E-21
BCP 0.918 *** -9.929 8.95957E-23
BES 0.909 *** -13.515 1.97009E-39
*/**/***: Denote the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level.
AR(1) Unit Root test for near‐integreted series
Bk. AR(1) T-stat p-value
NAT 0.934 *** -6.248 7.30845E-12
ALP 0.827 *** -10.270 7.24337E-16
*/**/***: Denote the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level.
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Table 6 : All banks except Greeks and without Greek sovereign  
 
Bank
#O
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²
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FR
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PT
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R
Ti
V
SX
B
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I
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G
D
LD
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ERS
1369
98.88%
6 682.15
+++
-49.88
0.94
***
0.08
***
0.03
0.02
-0.01
0.04
0.00
0.02
*
-0.01
0.00
*
4.39
-0.33
***
0.18
***
-2.87
-0.05
***
-7.27
***
0.77
1.71
-0.80
133.22
3.79
1.52
0.32
-1.16
1.07
0.77
1.81
-0.32
-1.77
1.17
-3.20
3.35
-1.62
-5.56
-5.62
0.43
1.15
42.108%
0.000%
0.016%
12.947%
75.116%
24.692%
28.588%
43.968%
6.984%
74.592%
7.736%
24.243%
0.143%
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0.000%
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**
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-2.01
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-2.55
2.68
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2.57
2.380%
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18.004%
32.779%
30.780%
94.890%
26.442%
21.663%
50.497%
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1.015%
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-3.66
**
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0.69
-0.03
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-6.79
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3.61
0.66
2.66
116.74
0.58
4.07
0.54
-0.11
-1.60
1.86
1.49
-0.01
-2.60
-2.24
-3.77
4.54
0.34
-2.98
-4.96
1.56
0.44
0.790%
0.000%
56.481%
0.005%
59.161%
91.294%
10.886%
6.273%
13.630%
98.914%
0.931%
2.537%
0.017%
0.001%
73.752%
0.296%
0.000%
11.999%
66.119%
D
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1369
98.04%
3 805.70
+++
26.29
**
0.88
***
0.03
**
0.01
-0.06
0.01
**
0.06
**
-0.01
**
0.03
***
-0.02
0.00
-1.05
0.02
0.32
***
-4.68
***
-0.02
***
-5.81
***
-1.78
0.63
2.14
89.76
2.22
0.75
-1.59
2.03
2.09
-2.42
4.08
-0.65
0.49
-1.50
0.41
8.65
-3.60
-3.61
-6.12
-1.46
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3.260%
0.000%
2.657%
45.479%
11.207%
4.289%
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13.495%
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-6.21
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64.118%
0.046%
36.019%
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73.849%
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18.562%
66.673%
0.000%
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0.000%
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38.656%
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-11.13
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6.69
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-2.73
2.83
-1.37
9.14
-3.18
1.62
-2.04
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10.40
-5.94
-6.21
-9.92
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0.007%
0.000%
57.604%
0.000%
0.973%
0.644%
0.474%
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0.000%
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10.491%
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0.005%
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0.017%
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*
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-0.09
**
0.32
***
-10.23
***
-0.03
***
-7.28
***
3.39
**
0.36
-0.14
76.81
0.95
4.75
-2.30
-0.65
1.27
-2.12
9.34
-1.72
2.12
1.38
-2.13
8.54
-7.52
-4.59
-8.05
2.48
0.31
88.856%
0.000%
34.304%
0.000%
2.167%
51.409%
20.596%
3.388%
0.000%
8.478%
3.386%
16.705%
3.357%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
1.321%
75.704%
CRE
1369
99.14%
8 780.14
+++
-56.01
**
0.82
***
0.03
0.07
***
-0.07
0.06
***
0.00
-0.01
***
0.05
***
-0.07
**
0.01
***
4.06
***
-0.33
**
0.42
***
-13.68
***
-0.03
***
-10.65
***
8.96
***
-2.30
-2.13
81.01
1.44
3.90
-1.49
5.92
-0.07
-3.08
5.76
-2.23
2.77
2.85
-2.03
9.46
-9.19
-5.34
-10.50
4.76
-1.52
3.346%
0.000%
15.008%
0.010%
13.566%
0.000%
94.816%
0.210%
0.000%
2.594%
0.562%
0.443%
4.209%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
12.835%
BO
I
1369
98.24%
4 248.67
+++
132.89
***
0.90
***
0.14
0.15
0.40
0.09
0.26
0.12
***
-0.05
-0.72
***
-0.03
-8.00
***
2.77
0.02
8.97
-0.01
-24.20
**
-21.65
*
20.25
*
2.88
78.72
0.96
1.05
1.05
1.20
0.88
3.68
-0.68
-2.64
-1.23
-2.92
1.01
0.07
0.78
-0.26
-2.25
-1.65
1.78
0.403%
0.000%
33.526%
29.362%
29.478%
23.119%
38.026%
0.024%
49.544%
0.839%
22.029%
0.354%
31.333%
94.762%
43.476%
79.361%
2.471%
9.863%
7.536%
IN
T
1369
99.57%
17 712.58
+++
27.17
0.85
***
0.00
0.10
***
-0.04
0.01
-0.12
***
0.01
**
0.15
***
0.06
0.00
-1.24
0.07
0.36
***
-5.07
**
-0.05
***
-9.55
***
8.81
***
7.37
***
1.48
90.46
-0.07
4.35
-0.57
1.01
-2.60
2.00
10.75
1.40
-1.45
-1.09
0.40
6.26
-2.49
-5.97
-6.24
3.81
3.90
13.798%
0.000%
94.378%
0.001%
56.816%
31.092%
0.940%
4.552%
0.000%
16.147%
14.614%
27.396%
68.570%
0.000%
1.286%
0.000%
0.000%
0.015%
0.010%
U
N
I
1369
99.58%
18 203.94
+++
13.15
0.88
***
0.03
0.08
***
-0.01
0.02
-0.18
***
0.01
**
0.15
***
0.06
-0.01
*
0.25
-2.01
*
0.40
***
-5.61
***
-0.07
***
-10.85
***
7.21
***
4.05
**
0.72
103.76
1.21
3.49
-0.11
1.32
-3.79
2.45
9.75
1.43
-1.92
0.24
-1.95
6.76
-2.89
-7.91
-7.66
3.04
1.98
47.348%
0.000%
22.634%
0.049%
91.579%
18.614%
0.016%
1.434%
0.000%
15.269%
5.533%
80.673%
5.152%
0.000%
0.387%
0.000%
0.000%
0.244%
4.798%
IN
G
1369
99.03%
7 765.17
+++
-60.36
***
0.92
***
0.01
0.03
**
-0.09
***
0.00
0.06
**
0.00
0.02
***
0.00
0.00
3.84
***
-0.42
***
0.21
***
-6.33
***
-0.02
***
-2.17
**
3.10
***
-0.01
-4.98
113.95
0.82
2.09
-2.71
0.41
2.47
1.15
2.67
0.16
-1.60
5.27
-2.67
5.67
-5.11
-4.34
-2.31
2.82
-0.02
0.000%
0.000%
41.195%
3.684%
0.675%
68.052%
1.362%
25.048%
0.763%
87.379%
11.018%
0.000%
0.759%
0.000%
0.000%
0.002%
2.113%
0.483%
98.743%
BCP
1369
99.77%
33 317.78
+++
-36.59
*
0.92
***
-0.16
***
0.22
***
0.04
0.01
0.11
0.03
***
0.07
**
-0.07
0.05
***
2.61
*
-4.09
0.23
-4.83
-0.04
*
-9.02
***
-1.68
17.51
***
-1.67
110.64
-2.73
3.49
0.29
0.33
0.97
2.94
2.45
-0.65
5.67
1.92
-0.63
1.64
-1.12
-1.89
-2.61
-0.27
3.84
9.501%
0.000%
0.642%
0.050%
76.854%
73.994%
33.329%
0.331%
1.450%
51.756%
0.000%
5.482%
52.815%
10.034%
26.105%
5.926%
0.917%
78.743%
0.013%
BES
1369
99.82%
41 389.06
+++
-36.76
**
0.91
***
-0.14
***
0.22
***
0.14
0.17
***
-0.20
***
0.02
**
-0.04
**
0.07
0.04
***
3.59
***
-3.68
***
0.20
**
-2.67
-0.05
***
-9.37
***
-1.21
13.47
***
-2.57
135.20
-3.61
5.65
1.54
8.56
-2.81
2.35
-2.45
1.03
7.71
4.33
-2.72
2.18
-0.94
-4.00
-4.12
-0.33
4.23
1.015%
0.000%
0.032%
0.000%
12.311%
0.000%
0.500%
1.890%
1.442%
30.200%
0.000%
0.002%
0.660%
2.921%
34.662%
0.007%
0.004%
74.102%
0.002%
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Table 7: All banks except Greeks and without Greek sovereign (Only significant parameters left) 
 
B
ank
#O
bs.
A
djR
²
Fisher
p-Value
Itr.
Lg1
A
T
B
E
D
E
SP
FR
IE
IT
N
L
PT
SPi
R
Ti
V
SX
B
O
I
B
B
B
G
D
L
D
O
D
ER
S
1369
98.88%
6 682.15
+++
0.00
0.94
***
0.08
***
0.02
*
0.00
*
-0.33
***
0.18
***
-0.05
***
-7.27
***
133.22
3.79
1.81
-1.77
-3.20
3.35
-5.56
-5.62
0.02%
6.98%
7.74%
0.14%
0.08%
0.00%
0.00%
R
A
I
1369
98.92%
6 955.39
+++
0.00
-66.02
**
0.93
***
0.12
***
-0.01
**
4.66
**
-0.10
**
0.14
***
-4.68
***
-0.02
***
-3.96
***
3.35
**
-2.26
118.39
6.29
-2.01
2.57
-2.55
2.68
-2.64
-2.61
-3.03
2.57
2.38%
0.00%
4.46%
1.01%
1.10%
0.74%
0.83%
0.92%
0.25%
1.02%
K
B
C
1369
99.21%
9 523.89
+++
0.00
73.41
***
0.94
***
0.09
***
0.01
*
-0.01
***
-3.66
**
-0.12
***
0.25
***
-0.03
***
-6.79
***
2.66
116.74
4.07
1.86
-2.60
-2.24
-3.77
4.54
-2.98
-4.96
0.79%
0.01%
6.27%
0.93%
2.54%
0.02%
0.00%
0.30%
0.00%
D
EU
1369
98.04%
3 805.70
+++
0.00
26.29
**
0.88
***
0.03
**
0.01
**
0.06
**
-0.01
**
0.03
***
0.32
***
-4.68
***
-0.02
***
-5.81
***
2.14
89.76
2.22
2.03
2.09
-2.42
4.08
8.65
-3.60
-3.61
-6.12
3.26%
2.66%
4.29%
3.68%
1.56%
0.00%
0.00%
0.03%
0.03%
0.00%
C
O
M
1369
99.02%
7 715.91
+++
0.00
0.91
***
0.06
***
0.02
**
0.01
*
0.03
***
-0.06
*
0.24
***
-6.27
***
-0.02
***
-7.76
***
5.25
***
103.37
3.51
2.04
1.86
2.94
-1.80
5.35
-3.88
-2.75
-6.21
3.14
0.05%
4.18%
6.33%
0.33%
7.25%
0.00%
0.01%
0.61%
0.00%
0.17%
B
SN
1369
99.29%
10 657.94
+++
0.00
32.42
***
0.82
***
0.08
***
0.10
***
-0.11
***
0.03
***
1.21
**
-3.91
***
0.22
***
-4.53
***
-0.07
***
-6.08
***
7.22
***
3.04
*
3.31
78.55
4.29
8.04
-2.61
3.11
2.44
-7.36
4.17
-2.81
-8.48
-5.49
3.79
1.65
0.09%
0.00%
0.00%
0.93%
0.19%
1.49%
0.00%
0.00%
0.51%
0.00%
0.00%
0.02%
9.91%
B
B
V
1369
99.51%
15 569.64
+++
0.00
33.03
***
0.83
***
0.11
***
-0.14
***
0.12
***
-0.11
**
0.03
***
-2.33
***
0.31
***
-7.79
***
-0.06
***
-6.27
***
7.53
***
3.79
**
3.33
86.77
5.33
-2.69
9.14
-2.57
2.75
-6.40
6.05
-4.75
-7.47
-5.80
3.61
2.04
0.09%
0.00%
0.72%
0.00%
1.04%
0.61%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.03%
4.19%
SO
C
1369
99.34%
11 426.91
+++
0.00
62.97
***
0.80
***
0.12
***
-0.12
***
-0.03
***
0.10
***
0.09
***
-0.11
***
-1.65
**
-0.29
***
0.49
***
-9.64
***
-0.04
***
-11.13
***
6.05
***
3.97
76.62
6.69
-2.59
-2.73
2.83
9.14
-3.18
-2.04
-4.06
10.40
-5.94
-6.21
-9.92
3.77
0.01%
0.00%
0.97%
0.64%
0.47%
0.00%
0.15%
4.13%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.02%
B
N
P
1369
99.28%
10 542.19
+++
0.00
0.82
***
0.07
***
-0.09
**
-0.01
**
0.08
***
-0.05
*
0.00
**
-0.09
**
0.32
***
-10.23
***
-0.03
***
-7.28
***
3.39
**
76.81
4.75
-2.30
-2.12
9.34
-1.72
2.12
-2.13
8.54
-7.52
-4.59
-8.05
2.48
0.00%
2.17%
3.39%
0.00%
8.48%
3.39%
3.36%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.32%
C
R
E
1369
99.14%
8 780.14
+++
0.00
-56.01
**
0.82
***
0.07
***
0.06
***
-0.01
***
0.05
***
-0.07
**
0.01
***
4.06
***
-0.33
**
0.42
***
-13.68
***
-0.03
***
-10.65
***
8.96
***
-2.13
81.01
3.90
5.92
-3.08
5.76
-2.23
2.77
2.85
-2.03
9.46
-9.19
-5.34
-10.50
4.76
3.35%
0.01%
0.00%
0.21%
0.00%
2.59%
0.56%
0.44%
4.21%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
B
O
I
1369
98.24%
4 248.67
+++
0.00
132.89
***
0.90
***
0.12
***
-0.72
***
-8.00
***
-24.20
**
-21.65
*
20.25
*
2.88
78.72
3.68
-2.64
-2.92
-2.25
-1.65
1.78
0.40%
0.02%
0.84%
0.35%
2.47%
9.86%
7.54%
IN
T
1369
99.57%
17 712.58
+++
0.00
0.85
***
0.10
***
-0.12
***
0.01
**
0.15
***
0.36
***
-5.07
**
-0.05
***
-9.55
***
8.81
***
7.37
***
90.46
4.35
-2.60
2.00
10.75
6.26
-2.49
-5.97
-6.24
3.81
3.90
0.00%
0.94%
4.55%
0.00%
0.00%
1.29%
0.00%
0.00%
0.01%
0.01%
U
N
I
1369
99.58%
18 203.94
+++
0.00
0.88
***
0.08
***
-0.18
***
0.01
**
0.15
***
-0.01
*
-2.01
*
0.40
***
-5.61
***
-0.07
***
-10.85
***
7.21
***
4.05
**
103.76
3.49
-3.79
2.45
9.75
-1.92
-1.95
6.76
-2.89
-7.91
-7.66
3.04
1.98
0.05%
0.02%
1.43%
0.00%
5.53%
5.15%
0.00%
0.39%
0.00%
0.00%
0.24%
4.80%
IN
G
1369
99.03%
7 765.17
+++
0.00
-60.36
***
0.92
***
0.03
**
-0.09
***
0.06
**
0.02
***
3.84
***
-0.42
***
0.21
***
-6.33
***
-0.02
***
-2.17
**
3.10
***
-4.98
113.95
2.09
-2.71
2.47
2.67
5.27
-2.67
5.67
-5.11
-4.34
-2.31
2.82
0.00%
3.68%
0.68%
1.36%
0.76%
0.00%
0.76%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
2.11%
0.48%
B
C
P
1369
99.77%
33 317.78
+++
0.00
-36.59
*
0.92
***
-0.16
***
0.22
***
0.03
***
0.07
**
0.05
***
2.61
*
-0.04
*
-9.02
***
17.51
***
-1.67
110.64
-2.73
3.49
2.94
2.45
5.67
1.92
-1.89
-2.61
3.84
9.50%
0.64%
0.05%
0.33%
1.45%
0.00%
5.48%
5.93%
0.92%
0.01%
B
ES
1369
99.82%
41 389.06
+++
0.00
-36.76
**
0.91
***
-0.14
***
0.22
***
0.17
***
-0.20
***
0.02
**
-0.04
**
0.04
***
3.59
***
-3.68
***
0.20
**
-0.05
***
-9.37
***
13.47
***
-2.57
135.20
-3.61
5.65
8.56
-2.81
2.35
-2.45
7.71
4.33
-2.72
2.18
-4.00
-4.12
4.23
1.01%
0.03%
0.00%
0.00%
0.50%
1.89%
1.44%
0.00%
0.00%
0.66%
2.92%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
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Table 8 : Greek Bank Restricted Sample Regression 
 
Bank
#O
bs.
A
djR²
Fisher
Itr.
Lg1
A
T
BE
D
E
SP
FR
GR
IE
IT
N
L
PT
SPi
RTi
V
SX
BO
I
BBB
GD
LD
N
A
T
852
99.9%
41 341.06
+++
68.59
***
0.93
***
-0.05
0.17
***
0.31
-0.03
-0.08
0.00
*
-0.03
*
0.16
***
-0.23
*
0.06
***
-3.42
**
-0.71
-0.21
4.24
0.00
0.14
13.96
*
2.47
89.12
-0.67
1.98
1.52
-0.55
-0.44
-1.77
-1.95
3.03
-1.80
3.39
-2.40
-1.45
-0.85
0.53
0.08
0.03
1.67
1.381%
0.000%
50.098%
4.810%
12.931%
58.285%
65.976%
7.757%
5.131%
0.256%
7.181%
0.074%
1.660%
14.875%
39.822%
59.440%
93.631%
97.829%
9.499%
A
LP
852
99.8%
18 975.78
+++
158.55
***
0.83
***
-0.13
0.18
0.11
-0.07
0.40
0.01
***
-0.02
0.10
0.01
0.07
***
-8.64
***
-4.72
***
0.09
2.83
0.07
*
15.89
**
10.34
4.30
48.96
-1.33
1.47
0.39
-1.01
1.60
5.28
-0.94
1.47
0.08
2.83
-3.94
-3.50
0.26
0.26
1.82
2.28
0.89
0.002%
0.000%
18.236%
14.103%
69.502%
31.377%
11.044%
0.000%
34.501%
14.228%
93.499%
0.482%
0.009%
0.049%
79.119%
79.375%
6.957%
2.264%
37.227%
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Table 9 : Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Factor Estimation for the LTRO 
 
Effect Pure Total
ERS -141.67 128.10 -9.89 131.71 6.28 6.35 66.37 37.47 -97.49 -7.23
RAI -138.56 134.28 -9.89 131.71 12.46 4.57 66.37 37.47 -99.27 0.29
KBC -99.15 111.20 -9.89 131.71 -10.62 9.96 66.37 37.47 -93.88 22.01
DEU -140.05 122.94 -9.89 131.71 1.12 -2.02 66.37 37.47 -105.86 -19.13
COM -135.68 120.71 -9.89 131.71 -1.11 9.91 66.37 37.47 -93.93 -5.06
BSN -130.18 55.25 -9.89 131.71 -66.57 14.42 66.37 37.47 -89.42 -60.52
BBV -123.31 38.32 -9.89 131.71 -83.50 19.83 66.37 37.47 -84.01 -65.16
SOC -123.94 107.61 -9.89 131.71 -14.21 1.36 66.37 37.47 -102.48 -14.97
BNP -126.57 115.52 -9.89 131.71 -6.29 -3.99 66.37 37.47 -107.83 -15.04
CRE -133.82 99.15 -9.89 131.71 -22.67 7.68 66.37 37.47 -96.16 -26.99
BOI -224.17 121.34 -9.89 131.71 -0.48 38.06 66.37 37.47 -65.78 -64.76
INT -143.51 80.23 -9.89 131.71 -41.59 19.07 66.37 37.47 -84.77 -44.20
UNI -152.13 82.35 -9.89 131.71 -39.47 19.53 66.37 37.47 -84.31 -50.25
ING -134.55 121.13 -9.89 131.71 -0.69 2.04 66.37 37.47 -101.80 -11.38
BCP -145.25 37.65 -9.89 131.71 -84.17 51.92 66.37 37.47 -51.92 -55.68
BES -161.69 58.23 -9.89 131.71 -63.59 48.06 66.37 37.47 -55.79 -55.41
ERS -161.49 62.63 53.11 10.75 -1.23 97.14 25.03 75.72 -3.61 -1.72
RAI -158.45 61.50 53.11 10.75 -2.36 98.64 25.03 75.72 -2.11 1.69
KBC -150.37 56.15 53.11 10.75 -7.71 97.52 25.03 75.72 -3.23 3.30
DEU -159.81 60.21 53.11 10.75 -3.64 99.08 25.03 75.72 -1.66 -0.51
COM -157.30 63.59 53.11 10.75 -0.27 94.27 25.03 75.72 -6.47 0.57
BSN -148.74 41.39 53.11 10.75 -22.47 95.27 25.03 75.72 -5.47 -12.08
BBV -144.60 35.36 53.11 10.75 -28.50 95.84 25.03 75.72 -4.91 -13.40
SOC -158.97 54.88 53.11 10.75 -8.97 100.10 25.03 75.72 -0.64 -3.98
BNP -156.81 56.09 53.11 10.75 -7.77 97.26 25.03 75.72 -3.49 -3.46
CRE -151.18 57.15 53.11 10.75 -6.71 94.78 25.03 75.72 -5.97 0.74
BOI -216.92 63.70 53.11 10.75 -0.16 96.04 25.03 75.72 -4.71 -57.17
INT -159.32 52.67 53.11 10.75 -11.19 95.31 25.03 75.72 -5.44 -11.35
UNI -160.09 50.69 53.11 10.75 -13.17 94.92 25.03 75.72 -5.83 -14.48
ING -157.15 63.17 53.11 10.75 -0.69 94.58 25.03 75.72 -6.17 0.60
BCP -185.97 39.47 53.11 10.75 -24.39 97.03 25.03 75.72 -3.72 -49.47
BES -161.17 45.53 53.11 10.75 -18.33 96.88 25.03 75.72 -3.87 -18.76
ERS 22.21 37.79 31.62 6.21 -0.04 -70.75 -64.40 22.87 -29.22 -10.75
RAI 21.49 37.80 31.62 6.21 -0.04 -70.04 -64.40 22.87 -28.51 -10.75
KBC 26.20 35.09 31.62 6.21 -2.74 -69.47 -64.40 22.87 -27.94 -8.18
DEU 22.18 37.06 31.62 6.21 -0.78 -71.48 -64.40 22.87 -29.94 -12.24
COM 23.49 37.74 31.62 6.21 -0.09 -72.06 -64.40 22.87 -30.53 -10.83
BSN 35.11 26.69 31.62 6.21 -11.14 -70.05 -64.40 22.87 -28.52 -8.25
BBV 37.37 23.79 31.62 6.21 -14.04 -68.14 -64.40 22.87 -26.61 -6.98
SOC 25.03 34.97 31.62 6.21 -2.87 -69.75 -64.40 22.87 -28.22 -9.75
BNP 28.35 34.75 31.62 6.21 -3.09 -73.45 -64.40 22.87 -31.92 -10.36
CRE 31.13 34.82 31.62 6.21 -3.02 -72.27 -64.40 22.87 -30.74 -6.31
BOI -60.17 37.98 31.62 6.21 0.14 -63.05 -64.40 22.87 -21.52 -85.24
INT 30.30 32.38 31.62 6.21 -5.46 -68.76 -64.40 22.87 -27.23 -6.09
UNI 30.29 30.61 31.62 6.21 -7.22 -68.95 -64.40 22.87 -27.41 -8.04
ING 26.31 37.66 31.62 6.21 -0.17 -73.94 -64.40 22.87 -32.41 -9.97
BCP -5.19 26.81 31.62 6.21 -11.03 -58.51 -64.40 22.87 -16.98 -36.90
BES 9.35 29.37 31.62 6.21 -8.47 -59.68 -64.40 22.87 -18.15 -20.96
LTRO +/- 150 Trading Days (≈ 6M)
A B BS BC BP C CS CC
Changes with Cst. Coefficients New Coefficients post LTRO
Bank LTRO +/- 25 Trading Days (≈ 1M)
LTRO +/- 75 Trading Days (≈ 3M)
CP A+B+C
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Table 10 : Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Factor Estimation for the OMT 
 
Effect Pure Total
ERS -75.37 -58.68 -66.22 -7.74 15.28 61.53 25.89 71.29 -35.65 -72.52
RAI -86.23 -63.10 -66.22 -7.74 10.86 68.75 25.89 71.29 -28.42 -80.57
KBC -89.04 -53.79 -66.22 -7.74 20.17 65.27 25.89 71.29 -31.91 -77.57
DEU -78.58 -56.77 -66.22 -7.74 17.19 67.86 25.89 71.29 -29.31 -67.49
COM -71.39 -75.41 -66.22 -7.74 -1.45 46.36 25.89 71.29 -50.82 -100.44
BSN -87.56 -120.65 -66.22 -7.74 -46.69 56.88 25.89 71.29 -40.30 -151.34
BBV -93.98 -119.69 -66.22 -7.74 -45.73 60.78 25.89 71.29 -36.39 -152.89
SOC -106.89 -51.56 -66.22 -7.74 22.40 76.93 25.89 71.29 -20.25 -81.53
BNP -91.48 -74.14 -66.22 -7.74 -0.18 61.88 25.89 71.29 -35.30 -103.74
CRE -76.53 -73.22 -66.22 -7.74 0.74 49.56 25.89 71.29 -47.62 -100.19
BOI -101.00 -73.91 -66.22 -7.74 0.05 60.72 25.89 71.29 -36.46 -114.19
INT -97.16 -71.54 -66.22 -7.74 2.43 54.18 25.89 71.29 -43.00 -114.52
UNI -108.77 -73.29 -66.22 -7.74 0.67 52.30 25.89 71.29 -44.87 -129.76
ING -63.39 -75.33 -66.22 -7.74 -1.37 46.83 25.89 71.29 -50.34 -91.89
BCP -98.76 -73.92 -66.22 -7.74 0.04 69.24 25.89 71.29 -27.93 -103.43
BES -103.15 -73.25 -66.22 -7.74 0.71 67.48 25.89 71.29 -29.69 -108.92
ERS -50.56 -26.18 -67.21 40.42 0.61 81.22 -64.45 121.92 23.75 4.48
RAI -54.82 -26.20 -67.21 40.42 0.59 85.84 -64.45 121.92 28.37 4.82
KBC -52.43 -26.20 -67.21 40.42 0.59 81.83 -64.45 121.92 24.36 3.21
DEU -56.44 -26.32 -67.21 40.42 0.47 88.04 -64.45 121.92 30.57 5.28
COM -42.96 -26.66 -67.21 40.42 0.13 71.36 -64.45 121.92 13.89 1.75
BSN -46.98 -22.86 -67.21 40.42 3.93 71.59 -64.45 121.92 14.12 1.75
BBV -48.61 -22.83 -67.21 40.42 3.96 71.31 -64.45 121.92 13.84 -0.12
SOC -63.47 -25.13 -67.21 40.42 1.66 91.32 -64.45 121.92 33.85 2.72
BNP -56.93 -24.22 -67.21 40.42 2.57 85.20 -64.45 121.92 27.73 4.04
CRE -48.69 -26.11 -67.21 40.42 0.68 73.80 -64.45 121.92 16.33 -1.00
BOI -52.95 -26.79 -67.21 40.42 0.00 66.80 -64.45 121.92 9.33 -12.94
INT -49.08 -26.69 -67.21 40.42 0.10 70.95 -64.45 121.92 13.49 -4.81
UNI -51.07 -26.76 -67.21 40.42 0.03 69.76 -64.45 121.92 12.29 -8.07
ING -44.70 -26.29 -67.21 40.42 0.50 74.90 -64.45 121.92 17.43 3.92
BCP -64.96 -26.79 -67.21 40.42 0.00 64.61 -64.45 121.92 7.14 -27.13
BES -58.54 -26.76 -67.21 40.42 0.03 65.57 -64.45 121.92 8.10 -19.73
ERS -56.13 -16.42 -9.12 -6.03 -1.27 66.69 -40.55 81.26 25.99 -5.85
RAI -59.49 -16.57 -9.12 -6.03 -1.42 71.67 -40.55 81.26 30.96 -4.39
KBC -58.40 -17.34 -9.12 -6.03 -2.19 67.34 -40.55 81.26 26.63 -8.40
DEU -62.02 -15.59 -9.12 -6.03 -0.44 74.06 -40.55 81.26 33.36 -3.55
COM -46.04 -15.03 -9.12 -6.03 0.12 56.07 -40.55 81.26 15.37 -4.99
BSN -53.14 -8.53 -9.12 -6.03 6.62 56.27 -40.55 81.26 15.56 -5.41
BBV -53.87 -8.58 -9.12 -6.03 6.57 55.94 -40.55 81.26 15.23 -6.51
SOC -68.02 -16.90 -9.12 -6.03 -1.75 77.57 -40.55 81.26 36.87 -7.34
BNP -61.49 -15.30 -9.12 -6.03 -0.15 71.01 -40.55 81.26 30.30 -5.79
CRE -51.57 -15.13 -9.12 -6.03 0.02 58.70 -40.55 81.26 18.00 -8.00
BOI -58.80 -15.19 -9.12 -6.03 -0.05 51.04 -40.55 81.26 10.33 -22.95
INT -48.43 -14.50 -9.12 -6.03 0.65 55.59 -40.55 81.26 14.88 -7.34
UNI -48.19 -14.40 -9.12 -6.03 0.75 54.30 -40.55 81.26 13.59 -8.29
ING -49.18 -15.00 -9.12 -6.03 0.15 59.91 -40.55 81.26 19.21 -4.26
BCP -69.88 -14.44 -9.12 -6.03 0.71 48.62 -40.55 81.26 7.91 -35.70
BES -63.69 -14.75 -9.12 -6.03 0.40 49.67 -40.55 81.26 8.96 -28.77
Changes with Cst. Coefficients New Coefficients post OMT
A B BS BC BP C CS
OMT +/- 150 Trading Days (≈ 6M)
CC CP A+B+C
Bank OMT +/- 25 Trading Days (≈ 1M)
OMT +/- 75 Trading Days (≈ 3M)
N. Fulli-Lemaire 
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Table 11: Pooled OLS results for the LTRO’s effect. 
 
  
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
816 418.98 0.64 0.39 -0.99 -0.26 1.07 ** -0.24 0.11 -0.39 * -0.10 22.48 *** 1.34 -2.48 -210.24 ** 0.22
1.61 1.58 1.11 -0.65 -0.80 2.22 -0.59 0.29 -1.78 -1.23 3.39 0.82 -1.29 -2.40 0.76
10.706% 11.346% 26.707% 51.859% 42.620% 2.684% 55.217% 77.329% 7.551% 22.059% 0.075% 41.009% 19.598% 1.686% 44.848%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
99.66% 0.62 *** -0.69 -0.15 -1.15 0.63 -1.55 ** 0.50 -0.12 0.34 -0.09 -5.61 -0.20 4.06 387.03 * -0.62
20.87 -0.87 -0.13 -0.49 1.20 -2.24 0.90 -0.26 1.13 -0.31 -1.52 -0.22 1.63 1.83 -1.37
0.000% 38.724% 89.373% 62.751% 23.149% 2.565% 37.007% 79.141% 25.787% 75.930% 13.013% 82.706% 10.312% 6.821% 17.026%
Fisher LD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
2 163.90 -161.69 -405.96 *** -437.30 *** -391.48 *** -502.74 *** -420.97 *** -453.28 *** -428.99 *** -458.43 *** -492.16 *** -449.33 *** 97.72 *** -340.08 *** -310.88 *** -476.39 *** 181.58 ***
+++ -0.43 -9.93 -9.65 -9.77 -8.27 -11.09 -9.51 -9.40 -7.41 -8.88 -10.20 7.97 -9.86 -9.38 -10.47 10.47
66.963% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 20.02 23.13 62.54 *** 21.63 26.01 31.51 38.38 * 37.75 35.11 * 27.87 -62.48 *** 18.18 9.56 27.14 16.43
1.18 1.25 3.74 0.92 1.43 1.43 1.88 1.55 1.65 1.40 -4.21 1.05 0.53 1.34 1.28
23.762% 21.019% 0.020% 35.639% 15.186% 15.424% 6.100% 12.133% 9.929% 16.236% 0.003% 29.407% 59.890% 18.092% 20.217%
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
2416 149.32 *** 0.18 ** 0.03 -0.15 0.36 *** -0.06 -0.12 *** 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 * 6.52 ** -0.38 1.86 *** -23.54 -0.31 ***
3.12 1.78 0.29 -0.53 3.35 -0.25 -3.42 -0.06 -0.56 -1.68 2.26 -0.72 3.90 -0.94 -5.13
0.185% 7.596% 77.382% 59.781% 0.082% 80.048% 0.063% 95.056% 57.537% 9.266% 2.394% 47.397% 0.010% 34.477% 0.000%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
99.28% 0.87 *** -0.67 ** 0.27 -0.32 0.28 -0.42 0.07 -0.20 * 0.23 0.04 -0.40 0.17 0.05 163.64 *** 0.05
100.15 -2.06 1.46 -0.56 1.57 -1.41 0.89 -1.76 1.18 1.20 -0.17 0.26 0.06 3.48 0.34
0.000% 3.992% 14.468% 57.400% 11.750% 15.900% 37.431% 7.873% 23.695% 23.156% 86.516% 79.301% 95.427% 0.051% 73.364%
Fisher LD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
5 531.67 -161.17 ** -114.77 *** -119.82 *** -112.22 *** -134.69 *** -128.73 *** -139.82 *** -133.24 *** -116.07 *** -139.19 *** -135.02 *** 44.24 *** -104.20 *** -101.73 *** -141.64 *** 64.65 ***
+++ -2.52 -7.29 -7.18 -7.30 -6.57 -8.93 -6.95 -6.76 -5.49 -6.48 -7.85 5.94 -7.56 -7.14 -8.13 9.29
1.173% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 -0.31 2.72 10.80 1.36 3.87 12.43 16.57 2.21 4.36 9.99 -55.75 *** 1.85 1.08 4.02 -24.80 ***
-0.03 0.21 1.00 0.08 0.32 0.83 1.18 0.13 0.30 0.78 -5.71 0.17 0.09 0.31 -3.17
97.794% 83.420% 31.575% 93.433% 74.698% 40.489% 24.001% 90.051% 76.545% 43.480% 0.000% 86.255% 92.571% 75.959% 0.154%
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
4816 69.14 * 0.07 -0.04 0.46 * 0.30 *** -0.18 -0.07 *** 0.13 * -0.09 0.02 3.01 -0.09 0.50 * -15.15 -0.28 ***
1.91 0.69 -0.39 1.80 4.26 -1.13 -3.86 1.85 -0.54 0.82 1.14 -0.39 1.70 -0.71 -4.72
5.645% 48.787% 69.920% 7.146% 0.002% 25.829% 0.012% 6.428% 59.220% 41.191% 25.320% 69.994% 8.836% 47.849% 0.000%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
98.68% 0.90 *** -0.13 0.33 ** -0.61 0.08 -0.42 * 0.04 -0.24 ** 0.29 -0.03 -1.84 0.08 1.74 *** 164.04 *** -0.24 **
146.62 -0.66 2.35 -1.38 0.71 -1.80 0.85 -2.22 1.48 -1.07 -0.78 0.15 3.42 5.23 -2.10
0.000% 50.787% 1.877% 16.905% 47.781% 7.230% 39.615% 2.679% 13.881% 28.612% 43.686% 87.944% 0.064% 0.000% 3.576%
Fisher LD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
6 010.81 9.35 -85.26 *** -87.61 *** -80.50 *** -96.37 *** -88.32 *** -92.85 *** -88.18 *** -84.48 *** -96.79 *** -92.60 *** 58.42 *** -76.48 *** -73.76 *** -97.12 *** 37.32 ***
+++ 0.21 -6.31 -6.52 -6.11 -5.84 -7.26 -5.02 -4.81 -4.98 -4.96 -6.12 8.66 -6.20 -5.52 -6.41 7.16
83.430% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 12.86 12.14 16.85 12.82 14.13 25.75 * 28.01 * 15.68 18.99 21.78 * -69.52 *** 20.94 * 20.94 * 16.96 -14.54 **
1.09 0.91 1.49 0.76 1.22 1.66 1.85 0.92 1.19 1.67 -7.63 1.95 1.77 1.28 -2.10
27.708% 36.524% 13.542% 44.468% 22.114% 9.664% 6.469% 35.854% 23.403% 9.443% 0.000% 5.082% 7.760% 20.079% 3.609%
LTRO +/- 25 Trading Days (≈ 1M)
LTRO +/- 75 Trading Days (≈ 3M)
LTRO +/- 150 Trading Days (≈ 6M)
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Table 12: Pooled OLS results for the OMT’s effect. 
 
 
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
816 0.00 *** 0.69 ** -0.11 -2.34 *** 0.67 *** -1.07 *** 0.13 -0.29 0.46 * -0.02 35.76 *** 2.48 *** 1.27 ** 109.30 ** -0.20
0.00 1.70 -0.33 -2.65 2.74 -3.95 1.00 -0.96 1.87 -0.16 3.96 2.91 2.07 2.26 -0.74
0.000% 8.884% 73.936% 0.818% 0.636% 0.009% 31.546% 33.833% 6.172% 87.559% 0.008% 0.374% 3.923% 2.420% 46.221%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
99.66% 0.45 *** -3.18 *** -0.36 3.76 *** -0.84 ** 1.03 ** 0.39 0.99 ** -3.15 *** 0.01 -3.11 ** 0.78 * 1.42 284.29 * 0.01
14.01 -2.72 -0.68 2.63 -2.37 2.09 1.31 2.29 -3.71 0.06 -2.33 1.91 1.33 1.77 0.01
0.000% 0.672% 49.952% 0.868% 1.819% 3.651% 19.078% 2.202% 0.022% 95.421% 2.030% 5.607% 18.252% 7.705% 98.858%
Fisher OD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
16 561.99 -103.15 -609.56 *** -649.29 *** -542.09 *** -700.84 *** -552.02 *** -473.28 *** -401.34 *** -630.50 *** -686.69 *** -561.67 *** -80.82 *** -376.31 *** -343.24 *** -644.05 *** 75.24 ***
+++ -0.82 -8.71 -8.98 -8.64 -8.65 -8.04 -8.06 -8.18 -8.49 -7.85 -7.95 -4.33 -7.75 -7.16 -8.00 8.51
41.299% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 27.78 *** 16.92 * 14.11 * 24.57 ** 31.76 *** 15.59 * 9.17 -3.74 11.67 26.62 *** 2.15 5.99 -5.62 39.76 *** 4.39
3.28 1.70 1.74 2.42 3.25 1.92 1.28 -0.31 1.11 2.78 0.38 0.81 -0.72 3.82 0.82
0.109% 8.915% 8.154% 1.581% 0.121% 5.559% 19.921% 75.600% 26.782% 0.549% 70.069% 42.007% 46.960% 0.014% 41.202%
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
2416 157.04 *** 0.58 *** ‐0.44 *** ‐1.30 *** 0.15 ** ‐0.33 *** 0.15 *** 0.12 0.35 *** 0.01 ‐2.44 * 0.10 *** 0.73 *** 192.69 *** ‐0.78 ***
5.01 4.08 ‐3.61 ‐4.87 2.40 ‐2.75 3.32 1.60 3.15 0.80 ‐1.82 0.28 2.61 6.43 ‐8.52
0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 1.64% 0.60% 0.09% 10.93% 0.16% 42.46% 6.82% 77.73% 0.91% 0.00% 0.00%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
99.58% 0.92 *** 0.08 0.82 *** 1.54 *** ‐0.46 *** 0.68 *** ‐0.35 *** 0.46 *** ‐1.82 *** ‐0.11 *** 0.79 0.50 ‐0.62 68.05 0.49 ***
114.33 0.23 4.07 3.48 ‐3.72 3.53 ‐5.57 3.62 ‐6.96 ‐5.78 0.81 1.39 ‐1.26 1.16 3.57
0.000% 81.58% 0.005% 0.050% 0.021% 0.042% 0.000% 0.030% 0.000% 0.000% 41.75% 16.46% 20.90% 24.77% 0.036%
Fisher OD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
9 477.56 ‐58.54 * ‐31.69 *** ‐35.01 *** ‐27.69 *** ‐35.69 ** ‐27.56 *** ‐22.87 *** ‐19.52 *** ‐28.41 ** ‐27.02 ** ‐24.82 ** 0.89 ‐16.38 ** ‐12.09 * ‐29.92 *** 10.75 ***
+++ ‐1.67 ‐2.91 ‐2.76 ‐2.79 ‐2.47 ‐2.75 ‐2.60 ‐2.60 ‐2.10 ‐2.06 ‐2.45 0.26 ‐2.28 ‐1.70 ‐2.59 3.62
9.59% 0.36% 0.58% 0.54% 1.35% 0.60% 0.93% 0.93% 3.59% 3.96% 1.44% 79.64% 2.29% 8.95% 0.97% 0.03%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 7.98 3.71 6.11 2.09 15.58 ** 11.55 ** 9.93 ** ‐4.93 1.60 9.85 5.59 9.46 * 7.47 13.84 * ‐6.42 *
1.42 0.50 1.13 0.26 2.24 2.12 2.14 ‐0.53 0.23 1.53 1.50 1.91 1.41 1.94 ‐1.79
15.64% 61.52% 25.79% 79.67% 2.52% 3.38% 3.27% 59.30% 81.66% 12.69% 13.31% 5.65% 15.75% 5.25% 7.34%
#Obs. Itr. AT BE DE SP FR IE IT NL PT SPi RTi VSX BOI BBB
4816 93.72 *** 0.02 0.19 *** -0.11 0.37 *** -0.52 *** -0.08 *** -0.09 ** 0.20 *** 0.01 -2.62 *** -0.24 1.51 *** 141.18 *** -0.47 ***
6.44 0.33 4.45 -0.80 9.86 -8.67 -4.08 -2.00 4.56 1.24 -4.12 -1.30 8.75 14.71 -8.93
0.000% 74.147% 0.001% 42.616% 0.000% 0.000% 0.005% 4.555% 0.001% 21.669% 0.004% 19.339% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
AdjR² Lg1 lAT lBE lDE lSP lFR lIE lIT lNL lPT lSPi lRTi lVSX lBOI lBBB
99.56% 0.93 *** 0.94 *** -0.02 -0.23 -0.39 *** 0.48 *** -0.03 0.30 *** -0.94 *** -0.07 *** 0.87 0.54 ** -1.28 *** -141.03 *** 0.50 ***
208.18 4.19 -0.13 -0.70 -5.38 3.54 -0.92 4.33 -4.67 -4.63 1.18 2.31 -4.59 -4.50 7.83
0.000% 0.003% 89.836% 48.531% 0.000% 0.041% 35.553% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 23.656% 2.103% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000%
Fisher OD F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
18 009.58 -63.69 *** -21.61 *** -21.31 *** -18.73 *** -20.87 *** -25.08 *** -17.19 *** -15.21 *** -13.72 * -16.72 ** -20.62 *** -0.74 -17.34 *** -15.69 *** -23.78 *** 8.52 ***
+++ -3.87 -3.96 -3.33 -3.74 -2.73 -5.13 -3.51 -3.50 -1.87 -2.52 -4.14 -0.36 -4.53 -4.15 -4.25 4.12
0.011% 0.008% 0.087% 0.019% 0.635% 0.000% 0.045% 0.046% 6.108% 1.175% 0.004% 72.133% 0.001% 0.003% 0.002% 0.004%
p-Value F1-l F2-l F3-l F4-l F5-l F6-l F7-l F8-l F9-l F10-l F11-l F12-l F13-l F14-l F15-l
0 7.57 4.20 5.29 1.67 17.65 *** 10.55 ** 9.82 *** -4.33 2.20 12.12 ** 4.89 * 15.26 *** 15.50 *** 14.51 ** -6.19 **
1.53 0.71 1.11 0.24 3.26 2.44 2.59 -0.59 0.37 2.36 1.78 3.76 3.64 2.54 -2.28
12.602% 47.748% 26.529% 80.665% 0.113% 1.472% 0.950% 55.616% 71.252% 1.844% 7.532% 0.017% 0.027% 1.126% 2.278%
OMT +/- 25 Trading Days (≈ 1M)
OMT +/- 75 Trading Days (≈ 3M)
OMT +/- 150 Trading Days (≈ 6M)
